IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

MARKCO PENN,

:

Petitioner, Case No. 1:09-cv-395

: Chief Judge Susan J. Dlott

-vs- Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

WARDEN, Chillicothe Correctional Institution,

•

Respondent.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This case was transferred to the undersigned on July 13, 2010 (Doc. No. 13), and is before the undersigned for initial review upon transfer.

Upon review of the Petition, the Magistrate Judge notes that, on the Civil Cover Sheet, Petitioner advised the Court that he had a related case, Case No. 1:08-cv-290, pending before the Honorable Sandra S. Beckwith of this Court. Upon examination of that case, the Magistrate Judge notes that it was filed April 25, 2008, on a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Writ, Doc. No. 1). As of the time he filed, he claimed he had been incarcerated 321 days in violation of his rights under the Ohio Speedy Trial Act, Ohio Revised Code § 2945.71, and the Ohio Constitution and sought habeas corpus relief. *Id.*

Petitioner filed this habeas corpus case on June 2, 2009, regarding the same conviction as is involved in Case No. 1:08-cv-290. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214)(the "AEDPA") amended 28 U.S.C. §2244(b) to read as

follows:

(b)

- (1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.
- (2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless--
 - (A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable: or
 - (B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

(3)

- (A) Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.
- (B) A motion in the court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive application shall be determined by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals.
- (C) The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or successive application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.

- (D) The court of appeals shall grant or deny the authorization to file a second or successive application not later than 30 days after the filing of the motion.
- (E) The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.
- (4) A district court shall dismiss any claim presented in a second or successive application that the court of appeals has authorized to be filed unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfies the requirements of this section.

The Supreme Court has held that a district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive petition without approval by the circuit court. *Burton v. Stewart*, 549 U.S. 147 (2007). Federal courts are of course courts of limited jurisdiction and jurisdiction cannot be conferred on them by consent or waiver of another party to object. A federal court is further obliged to note lack of subject matter jurisdiction *sua sponte. Ford v. Hamilton Inv. Co.*, 29 F.3d 255, 257 (6th Cir. 1994); *In re Millers Cove Energy Co., Inc.*, 128 F.3d 449, 450 (6th Cir. 1997); *Franzel v. Kerr Mfg. Co.*, 959 F.2d 628, 630 (6th Cir. 1992); *Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. v. Swan*, 111 U.S. 379, 4 S. Ct. 510, 28 L. Ed. 462 (1884); *Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley*, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); *Sumner v. Mata*, 449 U.S. 539, 548, n.2 (1981).

A review of the docket shows that Petitioner here has neither sought nor received permission of the Court of Appeals to file the Petition. Therefore the Petition in this case should be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because reasonable jurists would not disagree with this conclusion, Petitioner should be denied any requested certificate of appealability and the Court should certify that any appeal would not be taken in objective good faith.

July 20, 2010.

s/ Michael R. Merz

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report and Recommendations. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e), this period is automatically extended to seventeen days because this Report is being served by one of the methods of service listed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(B), (C), or (D) and may be extended further by the Court on timely motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and Recommendations are based in whole or in part upon matters occurring of record at an oral hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such portions of it as all parties may agree upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. *See United States v. Walters*, 638 F. 2d 947 (6th Cir., 1981); *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).